Making Justice Real

The Official Blog of the Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia

D.C. Appellate Decision Has Broad Impact for Self-Represented Litigants

Last month, the D.C. Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Wylie v. Glenncrest, No. 15-CV-146 (July 21, 2016).  This decision represents a victory by a Legal Aid client against her landlord and is likely to be one of this year’s most important poverty law decisions.

FACTS:  Glenncrest, a landlord, sued to evict Ms. Wylie for alleged nonpayment of rent.  Ms. Wylie had an excellent defense:  she had paid the rent and had receipts proving that she had done so.  But Ms. Wylie was also a pregnant single mother of three with a full-time job.  Going to court was difficult.  So, when her landlord’s lawyer suggested that if she continued to comply with a separate agreement she’d made for the payment of water bills, she would not have to attend the next court hearing, Ms. Wylie took him up on it. But, at the next hearing, instead of explaining this to the court, the landlord’s lawyer used Ms. Wylie’s failure to attend as a basis for obtaining a default against her.  Ms. Wylie did not receive notice of the next hearing, at which the landlord’s lawyer made misrepresentations to the court and obtained a judgment for eviction.  Ms. Wylie was evicted shortly thereafter.

Less than three months later, after an unsuccessful search for legal assistance, Ms. Wylie went back to court unrepresented and asked that the default judgment against her be vacated.  She explained to the court why she failed to show up to the hearings, why it took her almost three months to make her motion, and that she had a valid defense (namely, that she had paid all her rent and had the receipts to prove it).  The judge interrupted her, refused to allow her to fully testify, accepted the landlord’s lawyer’s statements over hers, and declined to even look at her documentation.  Ultimately, the court denied her motion, primarily because it took her almost three months to file.  She appealed that denial to the Court of Appeals and obtained legal representation on her appeal from Legal Aid.

DECISION:  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new decision by the Superior Court.  It held that the Superior Court should have allowed Ms. Wylie to testify fully and to present her evidence.  It also held that the Superior Court had not properly considered the relevant factors.  The trial court had not given sufficient weight to the fact that Ms. Wylie claimed to have paid all of her rent and to the realities of her life that required Ms. Wylie to take a reasonable amount of time to file her motion.  The Court of Appeals made clear that if Ms. Wylie’s evidence proved her claims, “the default judgment should be vacated.”  This is an important victory for Ms. Wylie.

BROADER IMPORTANCE:  The lengthy (37-page) opinion in this case is likely to benefit not only Ms. Wylie but also countless other individuals who are attempting to navigate court systems without a lawyer.  Importantly, these benefits may not be limited to eviction cases but appear to apply generally to cases in DC courts and potentially beyond. Some highlights include:

  • A majority of tenants facing eviction do not have a lawyer because they cannot afford one and the District’s “oversubscribed” legal services organizations cannot represent them. (This is a problem that Legal Aid and other organizations are fighting to change).
  • Judges have a special duty to conduct a meaningful inquiry when an individual does not have a lawyer.
  • A court cannot simply accept the statements of a lawyer over the statements of a party who does not have a lawyer. Instead, the court must hear evidence and determine credibility.
  • In determining whether to vacate a default judgment, whether the tenant (or other party seeking to vacate such a judgment) has a meritorious argument is extremely important. When the defendant has a meritorious defense, the default should be vacated.  This is particularly important for unrepresented individuals who are more likely to make procedural mistakes in court even though they may be right about the substance of their claims.
  • Judges should consider the real lives of the individuals before them. While the trial judge determined that almost three months was too long for Ms. Wylie to have waited – without meaningfully considering her specific circumstances – the Court of Appeals considered her specific circumstances, including that she “had been evicted from her home, did not have a lawyer to represent her, was working full-time, and was trying to take care of four children as a single parent.”
  • Courts must provide clear notices. The Court of Appeals criticized the form that the Superior Court uses to notify parties of certain hearings because it used language that would be “entirely unclear to most pro se [unrepresented] litigants.”  The Court required such notices to be in “plain, simple, and straightforward language that would . . . promote the understanding of persons who are unable to obtain counsel and are left to navigate the court system on their own.”

In sum, we are extremely pleased with the thorough and broadly applicable holding in Wylie and are optimistic that it will lead to meaningful improvements in the abilities of unrepresented parties to access justice in all civil proceedings in the District of Columbia.

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